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THE PROPOSED ABOLITION OF INHERENT
AGENCY AUTHORITY BY THE RESTATEMENT




Over the past five years the American Law Institute
("ALI") has engaged in drafting a Restatement (Third) of
Agency ("Restatement (Third)),' which is intended to super-
sede the influential 1958 Restatement (Second) of Agency
("Restatement (Second). 2 As of May, 2004, five Tentative
Drafts of the Restatement (Third) have been released,3 and an
ALI-endorsed Official Draft is likely to soon follow.
One significant change proposed by the Restatement
(Third) is a different specification of the sources of authority
by which an agent can commit his principal to contractual ob-
* Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
J.D., 1985, Yale Law School; Ph.D., 1978, University of Iowa. I would like to
thank Deborah A. DeMott for her extensive and insightful comments on an ear-
lier draft of this article.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000)
[hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 1]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2]; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Tentative Draft
No. 31; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003) [herein-
after Tentative Draft No. 4]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 5]. The Reporter for this effort is
Professor Deborah A. DeMott, David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke Law
School.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)]. The Reporter for the Restatement (Second) was the prominent
scholar Warren A. Seavey, who was generally regarded as the leading expert of
his era on agency. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at ix.
3. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1; Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1;
Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 1; Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 1; Tenta-
tive Draft No. 5, supra note 1.
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ligations. Under the Restatement (Second) framework an
agent, a person who has consented to act on behalf of and
subject to the control of another person, labeled the principal,4
can contractually commit the principal if the agent possesses
either the actual authority,' apparent authority,6 or inherent
authority sufficient to do so! A principal can also become
contractually obligated as a result of unauthorized agent acts
if the principal subsequently ratifies those acts."
However, the Restatement (Third) in its present draft
form does not incorporate the concept of inherent authority. 9
Instead, it relies on the combination of an expanded definition
of apparent authority and broadened estoppel doctrines to
address the situations that now fall either within the scope of
inherent authority or under estoppel doctrines' ° under the
Restatement (Second).1
The usefulness of the concept of inherent authority has
been questioned by several scholars since the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) first used the phrase.'2 The Restate-
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 1.
5. Id. § 7 ("Authority is the power of the agent to affect the legal relations
of the principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestation of
consent to him.").
6. Id. § 8 ("Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of
another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the
other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestation to such
third persons.").
7. Id. § 8A. The precise phrase used in section 8A is "inherent agency
power," presumably to make it clear that this is a form of agency authority that
does not stem from either the consent of or actions of the principal. See id.
8. Id. § 82 ("Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which
did not bind him but which was done or professedly done on his account,
whereby the act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally author-
ized by him.").
9. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at xvii ("[Tihe doctrine of inherent
agency power, stated in Restatement Second, Agency § 8A, is not used in this
[Third] Restatement.").
10. The Restatement (Second) estoppel doctrine is presented in section 8B.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 8B.
11. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at 105 ("[T]his Restatement, does
not use the concept of inherent agency power .... Situations that inherent
agency power is said to govern are covered herein by other doctrines .... ").
12. See, e.g., J. DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC IN A
NUTSHELL, at 137-41 (2d ed. 2001); Steven A. Fishman, Inherent Agency Pow-
ers--Should Enterprise Liability Apply to Agents' Unauthorized Contracts, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1987). But see Edward Mearns, Jr., Comment, Vicarious Li-
ability for Agency Contracts, 48 VA. L. REV. 50 (1962) (arguing in favor of utiliz-
ing inherent agency authority to impose respondeat superior liability on princi-
pals for contractual obligations).
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ment (Thirdis proposed abolition of inherent authority can be
regarded as an attempt to address those scholars' concerns.
However, the limited commentary that this proposal has gen-
erated in law reviews has been quite critical. 3 These recent
writers have argued that the elimination of inherent author-
ity would muddle important conceptual distinctions, 4 and the
new Restatement (Third) framework will lead to different and
inferior results when applied to situations now encompassed
by inherent authority principles.'"
I disagree with those critics and favor the Restatement
(Thirdis proposed abolition of inherent authority, although
the proposal does have its shortcomings. The proposal defi-
nitely does not merit as harsh a reception as it has received in
the law review literature, where it has been criticized too
strongly and for the wrong reasons.
In this introduction, I will first briefly summarize my
modest and hopefully constructive criticisms of the Restate-
ment (Third) proposal and the harsh reactions to it. 6 In the
body of this article, I will then more fully elaborate my
views. 7 Finally, I will propose some suggested additions to
the Restatement (Third]s comments and reporter's notes that
would address my primary concern." My concern is that the
Restatement (Third) proposal shares the problem of the exist-
ing Restatement (Second) framework in that it is also poten-
tially susceptible to an interpretation that would extend
broad, tort-like respondeat superior liability' 9 to the contrac-
20tual context.
13. See Kornelia Dormire, Comment, Inherent Agency Power: A Modest
Proposal for the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus.
L. 243 (2001); Matthew P. Ward, Note, A Restatement or a Redefinition: Elimi-
nation of Inherent Agency in the Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of
Agency, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1585 (2002).
14. Dormire, supra note 13, at 255-56.
15. Ward, supra note 13, at 1621-28.
16. See infra Parts II and III.
17. See infra Parts IV and V.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. This is the legal doctrine that holds "an employer or principal liable for
the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of employ-
ment or agency." See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999).
20. This article will not address any of the many other changes made by the
proposed Restatement (Third) from the Restatement (Second), such as its at-
tempt to more systematically address the specific agency law concerns raised by
the increased economic role played by corporations and large partnerships, and
to condense the large number of different sections and take a broader and more
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The five Tentative Drafts of the Restatement (Third)
make it clear that one of the major motivations for abolishing
inherent authority, as scholars have recognized, is that the
courts have had difficulty ascertaining the conceptual bound-
ary between apparent authority and inherent authority."'
This is particularly the case in those situations where a prin-
cipal, without making any express representations of agent
authority to third parties, has placed his agent in a position
whose customary scope of authority exceeds the agent's actual
authority. The Restatement (Third) proposal solves this diffi-
culty by eliminating the inherent authority category, thus
mooting the need for this inquiry as to whether apparent au-
thority or instead inherent authority is the precise source of
agent authority.
Unfortunately, the Tentative Drafts fail to explicitly ad-
dress the other major motivating factor behind the calls for
the elimination of inherent authority, namely the fear that
courts may someday utilize the inherent authority concept to
expand principal contractual liability for unauthorized agent
transactions well beyond the traditional restrictions imposed
on such liability, towards the outer limits of a sweeping, tort-
like respondeat superior liability obligation.22 The expansion
of respondeat superior liability principles to the contractual
arena would be an inefficient and unwise step for the courts
to take,' and the inherent authority doctrine could become
generalized approach, and to recognize the encroachment of statutes and ad-
ministrative rulings upon areas traditionally governed by common law princi-
ples. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, A Revised Prospectus for a Third Re-
statement of Agency, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035 (1998) (discussing these
objectives from the perspective of the Restatement (Thirdjs Reporter).
21. See, e.g., Dormire, supra note 13, at 251; Fishman, supra note 12, at 24-
36.
22. See, e.g., Browne v. Maxfield, 663 F. Supp. 1193, 1199 n.6 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (expressing concern, in dicta, that application of the inherent authority
concept might lead to respondeat superior principles being applied to contrac-
tual issues arising under agency law); HYNES, supra note 12, at 141; Fishman,
supra note 12, at 35, 47-56 (emphasizing this concern throughout the piece and
offering recommendations intended to forestall this possibility). The Restate-
ment (Third) Tentative Drafts are not explicit that this fear that respondeat su-
perior principles might be applied to contractual issues is one of the primary
rationales for the proposed abolition of inherent authority, but this seems plau-
sible. See HYNES, supra note 12, at 141 (stating that respondeat superior con-
cerns are "perhaps in part" the reason for the Restatement (TMrd)s proposal to
abolish inherent authority).
23. See, e.g., HYNES, supra note 12; Fishman, supra note 12, at 21-22, 47-
Vol: 45
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the vehicle whereby this was accomplished. 4 However, the
Restatement (ThirdIs proposed framework of expanded ap-
parent authority and estoppel concepts, despite its other ad-
vantages, unfortunately appears to be as susceptible to use as
a justification for respondeat superior liability results in the
contractual context as is the Restatement (SecondIs existing
inherent authority and estoppel framework. The Restate-
ment (Third) proposal should be revised to address more di-
rectly and effectively this concern.
The critics of the Restatement (Third) proposal to abolish
inherent authority, however, have focused on issues other
than the potential for imposing respondeat superior liability
in the contractual context, and have failed to make a convinc-
ing case either that the proposal has serious theoretical flaws
or that it would lead to undesirable results in practice. 5 Con-
trary to what one of the major critics has argued, these new
provisions do not appear to be any less precise or coherent
than the inherent authority concept they would displace,"
and as noted above, would have the advantage of eliminating
the need for interpretive efforts at the boundary of apparent
authority and inherent authority. 7 Moreover, if the Restate-
ment (Third) framework is applied by the courts, as is dis-
cussed below this should not change the results regarding the
extent of contractual liability found to exist in any of the sig-
nificant factual contexts where inherent agency is now ap-
plied, despite claims to the contrary made by another major
critic of the proposal2 8
My conclusion that I will develop below is that the Re-
statement (Thirdis proposal to abolish inherent authority
24. See generally Fishman, supra note 12, at 21-22, 47-56. The Restate-
ment (Second) section 8B estoppel provision also has this potential, and this
concern is not addressed by the Restatement (Third). I will address this matter
later in this article. See discussion infra Part III.B.
25. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (corresponding to the dis-
cussions of Dormire and Ward).
26. See generally Dormire, supra note 13.
27. It should be recognized that this interpretive difficulty presented by the
Restatement (Second) framework is really only a relatively minor problem, rela-
tive to the much more significant problem of potential respondeat superior li-
ability, because it affects only the rationale of the judicial rulings finding agent
authority to exist and not their holdings, except to the limited extent that these
issues arise with regard to "special" agents who have very limited inherent au-
thority. See infra note 49.
28. See generally Ward, supra note 13.
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stands up quite well to the specific criticisms it has received
since it was first made available for public comment. But if
the inherent authority or estoppel doctrines of the Restate-
ment (Second) are ever used by the courts as the basis to ex-
pand principal contractual liability to the respondeat superior
outer limits,29 this use would raise very significant concerns,
and my major criticism of the Restatement (Third) proposal is
that it still leaves open the potential for such an expansion of
contractual liability under other rubrics. I therefore recom-
mend that the ALI engage in at least one further revision of
the Restatement (Third) proposal. I believe that this problem
can be adequately addressed without revising any of the pro-
posed black-letter sections; all that is needed are more ex-
plicit comments and Reporter's notes for some of the proposed
sections that would more clearly eliminate respondeat supe-
rior theories of contractual liability.
The remainder of this article proceeds in the following
manner. Part II of the article briefly summarizes and dis-
cusses the current Restatement (Second) framework of actual,
apparent, and inherent authority concepts, and its relation to
broader estoppel doctrines. ° Part III describes and discusses
several important criticisms of the Restatement (Second) in-
herent authority concept.3 Part IV then introduces the Re-
statement (Third]s proposal to abolish inherent authority.
Part V follows with a presentation and discussion of various
criticisms of this proposal.' Part VI provides my overall as-
sessment of the proposal, and offers a number of suggestions
for the inclusion of additional comments and Reporter's notes
that will better address the concerns that I and others have
raised.'
II. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) INHERENT AUTHORITY
CONCEPT
The Restatement (Second) contains a number of related
29. While no clear trend in this direction now exists, there are a few cases
and some commentary, which I will later discuss that suggest that this remains
a plausible possibility. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 39.
30. See discussion infra Part II.
31. See discussion infra Part III.
32. See discussion infra Part IV.
33. See discussion infra Part V.
34. See discussion infra Part VI.
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sections that together define three distinct sources of author-
ity under which an agent can commit his principal to contrac-
tual liability: actual authority, apparent authority, and in-
herent authority. 5 In addition there is a section which may
impose contractual liability on a principal, on the basis of es-
toppel, for certain unauthorized transactions done by an
agent for his principal's account.
6
Section 7 of the Restatement (Second) first defines the
authority of an agent as "the power of the agent to affect the
legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance
with the principal's manifestation of consent to him."37 Such
authority based upon consent by the principal is commonly
referred to as "actual authority," though that exact phrase is
not used by the Restatement (Second). The term "actual au-
thority" also includes what is commonly referred to as "im-
plied authority," which is the incidental authority necessary
to accomplish the objectives the principal seeks to obtain
through the authority expressly granted. 8
"Apparent authority," in contrast, is defined by section 8
as "the power to affect the legal relations of another person by
transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the
other, arising from and in accordance with the other's mani-
festations to such third persons."39 Section 8A then defines
"inherent agency power" to be "the power of an agent which is
derived not from authority, apparent authority or estoppel,
but solely from the agency relation and exists for the protec-
tion of persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other
agent.' °
There is a well-known line of English and American
cases, going back more than a century, which holds principals
contractually liable on the basis of the actions of their agents
even where no actual authority exists for the transaction at
issue, and no express representations of agent authority have
35. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, §§ 3, 7, 8, 8A, 27, 161, 194, 195.
36. Id. § 8B.
37. Id.§7.
38. Id. § 7 cmt. c. Comment c. notes that "implied authority" are those pow-
ers "implied or inferred from the words used, from "customs and from the rela-
tions of the parties." Id
39. Id.§8.
40. Id. § 8A. Note that inherent authority is defined as not overlapping ap-
parent authority, a point that is misunderstood by Matthew Ward in his cri-
tique of the Restatement (Third) proposal. See discussion infra Part V.B.
2005 343
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been made by the principal to the third parties involved in
the transaction that are sufficient to create apparent author-
ity, and where imposition of liability based on estoppel is not
justified.41 In response to the perceived need to explain and
justify the results reached in those cases, the drafters of the
Restatement (First) ofAgency of 1933 ("Restatement (First')
included in section 140 as bases for agent authority not only
actual and apparent authority, but also the (not there specifi-
cally named) "power arising from the agency relationship and
not dependent upon authority or apparent authority. 4 2 The
Restatement (Second) drafters attempted to further legiti-
mate this basis for authority by naming it "inherent author-
ity,4 3 and elaborated upon its contours a bit more fully in sec-
tion 8A as a power "derived... solely from the agency
relation,"' and in comments to that section. 45
The "derived... solely from the agency relation" lan-
guage of section 8A is quite vague, but its meaning is made
somewhat more clear by the comments. Comment a. identi-
fies two rationales for the inherent authority concept; the
need to ensure fairness for the parties dealing with the agent
and the goal of promoting the general commercial conven-
ience of all parties involved. 6 In accordance with the objec-
tive of promoting commercial convenience, comment a. makes
clear that while the primary intended beneficiaries of the in-
herent authority concept are the third parties who deal with
41. The best-known of these cases are Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison Inc., 239 F.
405 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), affd 242 F. 923 (2d Cir. 1917); Thurber v. Anderson, 88 Ill.
167 (1878); and Wateau v. Fenwick, 1 Q.B. 346 (1892). These cases are dis-
cussed extensively and approvingly in the literature. See, e.g., Dormire, supra
note 13, at 247-50; Fishman, supra note 12, at 9-13; Mearns, supra note 12, at
54-55; Ward, supra note 13, at 1605-10, 1628-30.
42. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 140 (1933) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (FIRST)]. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 15. The Reporter for
the Restatement (F'rst) of Agency ("estatement (Firstr) was the noted scholar
Floyd R, Mechem, who was generally regarded as the leading expert of his era
on agency law. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at ix.
43. WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 17 (1964) ("The
facile use of 'apparent authority'. . . conceal[s] the gradual expansion of the li-
ability of masters and other principals. Perhaps now that a name has been
given to the [inherent agency] power it will be recognized more readily.").
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 8A.
45. Id. § 8A cmts. a-c.
46. Id. § 8A cmt. a. See also Dormire, supra note 13, at 247; Fishman, supra
note 12, at 17-18.
344 Vol: 45
INHERENTAGENCYA UTHORITY
the agent,47 the concept of inherent authority also is intended
to benefit "the business world and hence [be] to the advantage
of employers as a class"' because it allows persons who deal
with their employees to rely upon the fact that those employ-
ees will have agency powers of the usual scope. Section 8A is
not limited in application to any particular type of agency re-
lationship, and therefore applies broadly to both "general"
and "special" agency relationships."'
There are several other relevant sections of the Restate-
ment (irst)-specifically sections 161, 194 and 195-that
were carried forward both in their numbering and in their
content by the Restatement (Second)." These sections further
explain the nature and extent of inherent agency authority,
though they are by no means models of clarity as to their
scope of application and taken as a group may not exhaust
the possibilities for the creation of inherent authority under
section 8A.5" Section 161 more specifically confers inherent
authority upon general agents who are acting for fully or par-
tially disclosed principals when they enter their principal into
contracts through acts which "usually accompany or are inci-
dental to transactions which the agent is authorized to con-
duct if, although they are forbidden by the principal, the
other party reasonably believes that the agent is authorized
to do them and has no notice that he is not so authorized."
52
This provision appears to specify the extent of inherent au-
thority in those situations where a partially or fully disclosed
principal creates inherent authority solely by putting a gen-
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 8A cmt. a.
48. Id.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 3. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) section 3(1) defines a "general agent" as "an agent authorized to conduct a
series of transactions involving a continuity of service," and section 3(2) defines
a "special agent" as "an agent authorized to conduct a single transaction or a
series of transactions not involving continuity of service." Id.
50. Id. §§ 161, 194, 195. However, the comments to section 161 were stated
more broadly in the Restatement (Second) with regard to the relative impor-
tance of the goal of promoting commercial convenience than they were in the
Restatement (First). See Fishman, supra note 12, at 17 n.90.
51. See, e.g., Croisant v. Watrud, 432 P.2d 799 (Or. 1967).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 161. Section 161 is based upon
the result reached in the classic case of Thurber v. Anderson. See Thurber v.
Anderson, 88 111. 167 (1878). Comment h. to section 161 makes clear that spe-
cial agents may also have inherent authority powers, but to a much more lim-
ited extent than general agents. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, §
161 cmt. h.
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eral agent into a position which reasonably suggests to third
parties some customary scope of agency authority and with-
out the principal making any express representations of the
scope of agent authority to those third parties.n
Section 194, in more specific terms, confers some inher-
ent authority upon general agents acting on behalf of undis-
closed principals, when those agents are actually authorized
by their principal to enter into ,some transactions, or when
they enter their principal into contracts through acts "usual
or necessary in such [actually authorized] transactions, al-
though forbidden by the principal to do them." '
Section 195 confers some inherent authority on any kind
of agent, general or special, who is acting on behalf of an un-
disclosed principal when that agent is entrusted to manage
the business of his principal and the agent then enters his
principal into a contract "usual in such businesses and on the
principal's account, although contrary to the direction of the
principal."55 These latter two sections can also be regarded as
providing guidance for finding inherent authority to exist,
and for defining its scope to include customary transactions in
circumstances where an agent is placed in a position that
does not involve the express representation of agent authority
by the principal to third persons, as does section 161, rather
applicable only to undisclosed principal situations.56
Finally, section 8B of the Restatement (Second), under
several different circumstances listed, holds a principal liable
on the basis of estoppel for unauthorized agent transactions
with third parties who believed that those transactions had
53. Fishman, supra note 12, at 18 n.97. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 2, §§ 27, 27 cmt. a. Section 27 is a little-known and rarely cited pro-
vision that suggests that the act of a principal placing an agent into a position of
customary authority creates to that extent apparent rather than inherent au-
thority, thereby contradicting the thrust of section 161.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 194. Section 194 is based upon
the result reached in the classic case of Watteau v. Fenwick. See Wateau v.
Fenwick, 1 Q.B. 346, 346-49 (1892).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 195. Section 195 also ad-
dresses the situation that arose in the classic case of Watteau v. Fenwick. See
Watteau, 1 Q.B. at 346-49. Special agents entrusted with a business have much
more limited inherent agency powers. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 2, § 195A.




been authorized by the principal." The broadest and most
significant situations addressed by section 8B are when the
principal, without either conferring actual authority on the
agent to enter the principal into a particular transaction, or
making a manifestation to third parties sufficient to create
apparent authority that covers such a transaction, and under
circumstances that do not justify finding inherent authority
to exist, either intentionally or carelessly causes a belief to be
formed by the third party that such authority exists on the
part of the agent, or at least knows of the belief and does not
take reasonable measures to correct the situation.58
Let me briefly summarize the import of these numerous
related Restatement (Second) provisions, which operate to-
gether in a complex, comprehensive and not entirely consis-
tent fashion. The scope of an agent's actual authority to con-
tractually commit his principal is defined by what authority
the principal has directly conferred on the agent.59 The scope
of an agent's apparent authority, if any, with respect to a par-
ticular third party is defined by the nature of the "manifesta-
tion" of agent authority that has been made by the principal
to that third party. The existence of apparent authority is
mooted if the manifestation of agency authority made by the
principal to that third party is no broader than the scope of
the agent's actual authority. However, where such manifes-
tation of authority exceeds the scope of the agent's actual au-
thority then the additional apparent authority thereby con-
ferred can be legally significant as an independent basis for
imposing contractual liability.
The scope of an agent's inherent authority begins where
actual and apparent authority taken together leave off,6° and
extends to include that additional authority that is necessary
to protect the interests of persons dealing with the agent, or
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 8B.
58. Id.
59. This actual authority would also include the "implied" authority inciden-
tal to carrying out those actually authorized transactions. In other words, "im-
plied" authority differs from apparent authority or inherent authority in that it
is an aspect of authority that is actually conferred by the principal upon the
agent. See discussion supra Part II.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 8A ("Inherent agency authority
is a term used ... to indicate the power of an agent which is derived not from
authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency rela-
tion ... ." (emphasis added)).
3472005
SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW
to promote general commercial convenience, but does not in-
clude any contractual liability that might be imposed on the
principal based on an estoppel theory.6 Therefore, for situa-
tions falling into the zone defined at one extreme by the bor-
der of an agent's actual authority or apparent authority, and
at the other extreme by the outer extent of inherent author-
ity, the inherent authority concept is to be used to determine
if principal contractual liability exists for the transactions at
issue. Outside of that zone of inherent authority are actual
authority and apparent authority situations, and the various
estoppel-based liability situations, and of course the many
circumstances where a principal is not held contractually li-
able on the basis of actions taken by his agent.
Those are the general contours of the inherent authority
concept, but the Restatement (Second) at sections 161, 194
and 195 also gives somewhat more precise guidance concern-
ing the existence and scope of inherent authority in certain
commonly-recurring circumstances where a principal places
his agent in a position to enter into certain transactions, but
does not confer the actual authority for the agent to enter the
principal into those transactions, nor make representations of
such authority to third parties." In those specific situations
where the other party to a contract knows that a general
agent is acting as an agent for a fully or partially disclosed
principal, the scope of the agent's inherent authority will ex-
tend to include those transactions outside of the scope of ac-
tual authority that the other party reasonably (though erro-
neously) believes are within the actual authority of the agent,
solely on account of the nature of the agent's position.63
Likewise, in those specific situations where the principal
is undisclosed, and the third party consequently is not aware
that a general agent is acting as an agent rather than on his
own behalf, the scope of the agent's inherent authority will
61. See id. § 8B. Where no actual, apparent or inherent authority exists,
but where a third party erroneously believes that an agent has sufficient au-
thority to enter into the transaction at issue either for a principal or for his own
account, and that belief is intentionally or carelessly caused by the principal, or
where the principal knows of the belief and does not take steps to correct it,
then principal contractual liability will exist under the estoppel provision of sec-
tion 8B for transactions within that zone of authority defined by the scope of
that belief. See id.
62. See id. §§ 161, 194, 195. But see supra note 53.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 161.
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extend to include those transactions that are usual in such
businesses as the agent is operating on behalf of the undis-
closed principal, since the other party will reasonably (though
erroneously) believe they are being done by the agent for his
own account.6
When either a general or a special agent is managing the
business of an undisclosed principal, the scope of the agent's
inherent authority will extend to include those transactions
outside the scope of the agent's actual authority but neverthe-
less usual for that sort of business, for the same reasons.6 5
Finally, under an estoppel theory a principal may even
be held liable for agent transactions lacking any form of au-
thorization at all, on an estoppel basis, under those circum-
stances where the principal bears some responsibility for the
third party's reasonable (though erroneous) belief that the
transaction was in fact authorized by the principal, or was
done by the agent for his own account, or when the principal
knows of the belief and does not take any efforts to correct it.
66
III. CRITICISMS OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) INHERENT
AUTHORITY CONCEPT
Let me now summarize and discuss the major criticisms
of the Restatement (SecondIs inherent authority and estoppel
framework which have previously been offered in the law re-
view literature. In my opinion the definitive critique of the
Restatement (Second~s inherent authority concept is Steven
Fishman's comprehensive 1987 Rutgers Law Journal article.
Several other writers have offered some limited comments re-
garding the inherent authority concept.' Fishman's article,
however, is the only sustained assessment of the evolution
and operation of this aspect of the Restatement (Second). The
other literature critiquing the inherent authority concept of-
fers no additional criticisms not presented by Fishman, nor
presents nearly as fully developed an analysis. Therefore, I
will first address Fishman's work, and then offer some addi-
64. Id. § 194.
65. Id. § 195.
66. Id. § 8B.
67. Fishman, supra note 12.
68. See, e.g., HYNES, supra note 12; Aaron Lipson, Whose Fool Is It Anyway:
Updating Apparent Authority for Today's Business World, 33 GA. L. REV. 1219
(1999); Mearns, supra note 12.
3492005
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
tional and related criticisms of the Restatement (Second) that
go beyond Fishman's arguments.
A. The Fishman Critique of Inherent Authority
Fishman's primary contention is that section 8A, com-
ment a.'s emphasis on the "underlying purposes of promoting
fairness and commercial convenience and the parallel be-
tween inherent agency power and vicarious liability of mas-
ters for the torts of their servants" 9 suggests that the drafters
of the Restatement (Second) may have intended "to expand
the liability of a principal for unauthorized contracts.., even
though the substantive language of the [Restatement (First)]
sections is unchanged."7 In Fishman's view, such an expan-
sion of liability is undesirable. He believes that the apparent
authority jurisprudence that existed prior to the promulga-
tion of the Restatement (Second) on the whole properly bal-
anced the competing interests of principals and third parties
in situations where actual authority was absent.7 Fishman
argues that the Restatement (Second]s inherent authority
concept was "designed to increase the impact of inherent
agency power,"72 and consequently has the potential to disturb
that balance by leading to judicial importation of the expan-
sive respondeat superior liability concepts that have been de-
veloped and applied in the tort context into the contractual
arena, thereby unduly favoring the interests of third parties
69. Fishman, supra note 12, at 17-18. See also id. at 22 ("The comments to
the Second Restatement state that '[tihe basis of the extended liability stated
in... [section 161] is comparable to the liability of a master for the torts of his
servant.'") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 161 cmt. a.).
70. Id. at 18. See also SEAVEY, supra note 39, at 16 ("These inherent agency
powers have been created by the courts in accordance with what they believed
to be for the benefit of the entire community."). Seavey also notes that "[tihe
extension of liability upon contracts to cases in which there is neither authority
nor apparent authority reacts ultimately to the benefit of the business commu-
nity, in that it tends to facilitate business transactions, now almost entirely con-
ducted by agents." Id.
71. Fishman, supra note 12, at 34 ("This interpretation emphasizes the pro-
tection of the third party as the key to inherent agency power and thus ignores
the balancing between the obligations of the principal and the third party,
which is a major part of traditional agency principles."). Fishman also notes
that "[i]t can be argued that the drafters of the Restatement (Second) intended
this result, even though the operative language of the sections did not go this
far." Id. at 34 n.161.
72. Id. at 17.
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over those of principals in such situations.73
It is apparent in reading Fishman's article that he was
reacting very strongly against what he regarded as unduly
expansive comments to the Restatement (Second), and
against a brief but provocative 1962 Virginia Law Review ar-
ticle by Edward Mearns. 4 Mearns argued that under the Re-
statement (Second), respondeat superior liability should be
broadly applied under the inherent authority concept to hold
principals liable for all agent acts, contractual as well as tor-
tious, that are "within the scope of the agent's agency
power."75 Fishman regards Mearns's article as advocating the
use of an expansive respondeat superior liability criterion in
contractual contexts that was "substantially the same as the
rule applied to determine the tort liability of masters."76
Fishman was very concerned that this interpretation of the
inherent authority concept would fail to "maintain a balance
between the losses borne by the principal and the third
party,"77 which resulted from agent contractual transactions
lacking actual authority. Fishman argued strenuously
throughout his article that this interpretation failed to recog-
nize the important distinction between consensual contract-
ing parties and non-consensual tort victims that made re-
spondeat superior liability an often inefficient78 and generally
unwise doctrine to apply to contractual liability issues.79
It is possible, however, to read Mearns's article more nar-
rowly as advocating an interpretation of inherent authority
that falls well short of imposing respondeat superior liability
upon principals for all unauthorized agent contracts. Mearns
does state that since the Restatement (Second) has now pro-
vided courts with the concept of inherent authority, the next
logical step for the courts "is to make contracts follow the
path of torts... [by] recogniz[ing] that the principal's liability
73. See id. at 34.
74. Mearns, supra note 12.
75. Fishman, supra note 12, at 23.
76. Id. at 23. See also id. at 2-3 ("Some scholars have argued that the prin-
cipal should be held liable for unauthorized contracts on an 'enterprise liability'
theory comparable to a master's liability for unauthorized torts of its servants
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.") (citing Mearns, supra note 12, at
56-57).
77. Id. at 23.
78. Id. at 21-22, 49-53.
79. Id. at 47-56.
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in contracts, as in tort, should be vicarious."" However,
Mearns then qualifies his position significantly by calling for
the development of a complementary limiting principle-
closely analogous to the 'scope of employment"' limitation on
respondeat superior liability in the tort context-to prevent
an undue expansion of contractual liability.8 He offers the
limiting language "scope of the agent's power" as a first at-
tempt to formulate such an appropriate restriction.82
Fishman did not specifically discuss this limitation that
was proposed by Mearns, and likely was of the opinion that
such a limitation would not prove to be an effective constraint
if the Restatement (Second) inherent authority concept was
understood to impose the general principle of vicarious liabil-
ity in the contractual area.
Fishman concludes his article with a call for abolishing
the concept of inherent authority, and in its place relying on a
much broader definition of what conduct by a principal would
constitute a "'manifestation" sufficient to create apparent au-
thority.' The expansion of the definition of "manifestation"
that Fishman calls for is to regard the simple placing of an
agent into a position by the principal without more as a
"manifestation" of authority sufficient to confer upon that
agent the apparent authority to enter the principal into
transactions with third parties that are customary for an
agent of that sort, even where the existence of a principal is
undisclosed.' He also argues that this expansive definition of
80. Mearns, supra note 12, at 51.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Fishman, supra note 12, at 46. Fishman suggested that the approach
taken in his article:
[Wihile somewhat imprecise, has the advantage of retaining the termi-
nology of apparent authority and being consistent with the way courts
are presently dealing with the issues. It is not a change in the existing
doctrine. Instead, the approach expressly acknowledges the expansion
of the term "manifestation" which has been implicitly adopted by the
court. It expressly retains the traditional balance between the princi-
pal's interests and the third party's interests as reflected in the doc-
trine of apparent authority. As a result of the confusion reflected in the
application of inherent agency power, the approach suggested in this
article seems to be more desirable.
Id. at 46.
84. Id. at 13. Fishman also considers:
[W]hether cases of this nature [the classic inherent authority cases] can
be decided legitimately without resort to inherent agency power. It is
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the term "manifestation is sufficiently close to a common
sense meaning of the term so that application should not be
difficult for the courts,"85 and that this approach is consistent
with existing court practice.8 He recognizes that such a
broad definition of "manifestation" is not without some sig-
nificant conceptual problems,87 but regards those problems as
much less serious than the potential harm that could be cre-
ated by a respondeat superior interpretation of the inherent
authority concept. Fishman also notes that under his ap-
proach it would no longer be necessary for courts to make the
often difficult distinction between general and special agents
that is commonly necessary under the current Restatement
(Second) provisions to apply the inherent authority concept.
88
Fishman, to his credit, did concede that his comprehen-
sive review of the inherent authority cases, decided in the al-
most thirty years that had by then elapsed since the promul-
gation of the Restatement (Second), did not indicate that the
courts were using the doctrine to extend principal liability for
unauthorized transactions on a tort-like respondeat superior
basis. This is contrary to what he believed the more expan-
sive Restatement (Second) comments and Mearns had advo-
cated. 9 However, he remained concerned that if the inherent
possible to explain each of these cases based on apparent authority if
the requirement that the principal make a manifestation to the third
party is not interpreted technically. In cases involving both disclosed
and undisclosed principals, placing the agent in a position where he
appears to have certain authority could be viewed as a manifestation
by the principal to each person dealing with that agent that he has the
customary authority of a person in a similar position to the agent.
Id. at 13.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id. at 14 n.74, 41-42.
87. Id. at 42-43. Fishman notes, for example, that regarding the placing of
an agent in a position as a "manifestation" of authority sufficient to create ap-
parent authority, while not similarly regarding the limitations placed on the
agent's authority by the principal as part of the same "manifestation," may lead
to difficulties for courts determining the limits of the broader manifestation
concept he advocates. He also notes there may be conceptual difficulties in re-
garding the placing of an agent into a position by an undisclosed principal as a
"manifestation" of authority sufficient to create apparent authority when the
third parties who contract with the agent are not even aware the agent is acting
as an agent rather than on his own account. See id.
88. Id. at 44-45.
89. Fishman, supra note 12, at 39 ("[Tlhe application of inherent agency
power does not appear to have increased the burden on the principal for losses
resulting from the unauthorized acts of agents.").
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authority concept remained viable it could possibly serve as
the basis for an unduly expansive imposition of contractual
liability on a respondeat superior basis.0 Therefore, he ar-
gued that it would be prudent to replace inherent authority
with expanded apparent authority based upon a very broad
yet manageable and appropriately constrained definition of
what constituted a "manifestation" of authority by a princi-
pal.91
B. Additional Critiques of the Inherent Authority Concept
Let me now offer some additional criticisms of the Re-
statement (Second) framework which were not the focus of
Fishman's article. The inherent authority concept operates
within a zone bounded at one extreme by actual or apparent
authority, and at the other extreme by the limits of inherent
authority." The breadth of this zone of inherent authority is
unclear because courts have found each of these borders diffi-
cult to locate.
First, regarding the border between apparent authority
and inherent authority, courts have grappled inconsistently
with classifying the situation where a principal places a gen-
eral agent into a position with a customary scope of authority
that exceeds the agent's actual authority.93 Courts have had
difficulty deciding whether this is best regarded as an implicit
manifestation through conduct of agent authority of custom-
ary scope, sufficient to create apparent authority for transac-
tions within that scope under section 8, or whether merely
placing an agent in a position with a customary scope of au-
thority is not such a "manifestation," but instead an act that
gives rise to inherent authority for transactions within that
customary scope under section 8A in order to protect third
90. Id. ("[A few] cases.., have suggested a more expansive interpretation of
inherent agency power and thus plant the seeds for a more expansive interpre-
tation of the doctrine."). See Croisant v. Watrud, 432 P.2d 799 (Or. 1967) (hav-
ing potential respondeat superior implications); discussion inia Part V.B.1.
However, I was not able to locate any opinions decided since the publication of
Fishman's article that embraced respondeat superior liability in the contractual
context, and there is at least one recent case which in dicta cautions against
such an expansive interpretation of the scope of inherent authority. See
Browne v. Maxfield, 663 F. Supp. 1199, 1199 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
91. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 56-57.
92. See discussion supra Part II.
93. Fishman, supra note 12, at 44.
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parties who reasonably expect the agent to have customary
authority and in order to promote commercial convenience.
The Restatement (Second) does not provide clear and
consistent guidance on this question. The term "manifesta-
tion" used in the section 8 apparent authority definition is not
defined in the Restatement (Second). Sections 161, 194 and
195, as discussed above, all suggest, although not explicitly,
that placement of a general agent into a position of customary
authority should be regarded as creating inherent rather
than apparent authority, and that apparent authority should
require a more express manifestation of authority by the
principal to the third party.94 However, section 27 and its ac-
companying comment a. suggest the contrary position that
merely placing an agent into a position of customary author-
ity is sufficient to create apparent authority.95 In addition,
sections 161 and 194 are expressly limited in their scope as to
general agents, perhaps suggesting that the placement of a
special agent into a position of customary authority should be
regarded as creating apparent rather than inherent author-
ity.
The Restatement (Second) is unclear as to what type of
agency authority is created when an agent is placed in a posi-
tion of customary authority that exceeds his actual authority.
The Restatement (Thirdis proposed abolition of inherent au-
thority resolves this problem. However, regardless of
whether the perceived basis of agent authority is apparent
authority or inherent authority, the result under the Re-
statement (Second) is the same: the principal will be held con-
tractually liable for the transactions performed by the agent
on the principal's behalf within the customary scope of au-
thority for the agent's position.96 This ambiguity in the Re-
statement (Second) agency authority framework, while lead-
ing to an untidy jurisprudence as to the rationale for
imposing liability, has not affected the results of the cases.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, §§ 161, 194, 195. See also
SEAVEY, supra note 39, at 16 ("There is neither estoppel nor apparent authority
present.., where a general agent, disclosing his principal, deals with a third
person who knows nothing of his authority, and binds his principal by an unau-
thorized contract."). This quotation paraphrases the position taken by the Re-
statement (Second) Reporter, Warren Seavey. See id.
95. See supra note 53.
96. One exception possibly is under circumstances where the agent is
merely a special agent.
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At the other border of the zone of inherent authority, un-
der section 8A and the supporting comments, inherent au-
thority extends only as far as is necessary to fairly protect
third persons dealing with the agent and to promote commer-
cial convenience. 97 Beyond that point, a principal will only be
held contractually liable on an estoppel theory, if at all.
Fishman's concern is that under the Restatement (Second)
inherent authority might some day be interpreted broadly to
incorporate respondeat superior liability. This concern may
be overblown. The courts may continue to extend inherent
authority only as far as the customary authority associated
with the agent position at issue, since that is all that is spe-
cifically called for by sections 161, 194, and 195, and this ap-
pears to be a sufficient extension to fairly protect the reason-
able expectations of third parties who are aware of the
customs involved. It must be conceded, however, that
Fishman has made a strong argument that the alternative
"commercial convenience" rationale for inherent authority
stated by the comments to section 8A could conceivably in-
voked to read this section more broadly as calling for further
extension of liability on a respondeat superior basis beyond
what may be the customary expectations of third parties.
Finally, there is an even more plausible doctrinal basis
existing under the Restatement (Second) for the incorporation
of respondeat superior liability into the contractual context
that was not addressed by Fishman. This doctrinal basis is
the section 8B estoppel provision, which is partially limited in
scope by the combined inherent authority-creating effects of
sections 8A, 161, 194, and 195.98 Under the Restatement
(Second) framework, the line here is apparently to be drawn
between those situations where the principal has without
more simply placed an agent in a position having a customary
scope of authority, thus creating inherent authority to that
extent," and those situations where the principal has in some
manner gone beyond placing his agent in this position, so as
97. This section would arguably extend only as far as the customary author-
ity given agents who hold the position. The broader definition of "manifesta-
tion" discussed above in the text would effectively eliminate inherent agency
authority as a meaningful concept.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, §§ 8A, 8B (limiting liability to
when a person is "not otherwise liable"), 161, 194, 195.
99. Or, for those courts who interpret the "manifestation" term of the Re-
statement (Second) broadly, thus creating apparent authority to that extent.
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to intentionally or carelessly lead a third party to believe that
the agent had greater authority than this, or at least knew of
this erroneous belief on the part of the third party and did not
take steps to correct it, thus justifying imposing contractual
liability on a principal on an estoppel basis.
It is clear that section 8B applies to situations where the
principal learns, or should reasonably have come to learn,
that his agent is purporting to a third party to have authority
which goes beyond any actual, apparent, or inherent author-
ity that exists, or where the principal learns of these false
representations but does not take any action to correct the
situation.00 However, it is less clear how to apply section 8B
to the simple "placing an agent into a position of customary
authority" situations. Under these circumstances, the agent
presumably has under section 8A inherent authority to the
extent of the customary authority associated with the posi-
tion, but no more.1"' It is unclear whether the principal would
then potentially be liable for agent transactions which go be-
yond the scope of this customary authority, on the basis that
he intentionally placed the agent in this position, and thereby
caused the particular third party involved to somehow come
to believe that the principal would be obligated by all agent
transactions, or at the least knew of such erroneous belief.
Therefore third party beliefs as to principal liability for
transactions exceeding customary authority may be regarded
as unjustified beliefs not worthy of legal protection by estop-
pel or otherwise.
The haziness of the boundaries of section 8B in my opin-
ion poses as serious a concern for the possible extension of re-
spondeat superior liability into the contractual context as
does the potential broad reading of section 8A inherent au-
thority that Fishman fears. Given the history of result-
oriented applications of estoppel doctrines in contract law, 02 it
would seem that estoppel is a likely vehicle whereby respon-
deat superior doctrines might be extended. Therefore, if
Fishman's concern as to the potential incorporation of re-
spondeat superior liability into the contractual context is to
be addressed by the Restatement (Third),0 ' not only will in-
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 8B cmt. c., illustration.
101. Butsee Croisant, 432 P.2d 799.
102. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 89, 90, 139 (1979).
103. I must concede that I am not aware of any cases decided since Fishman
2005 357
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
herent authority have to be restricted in its potential scope or
eliminated altogether and replaced by an authority basis less
open to such expansion, but also the estoppel doctrines will
have to be more clearly stated and circumscribed so as to also
exclude the potential for imposing respondeat superior liabil-
ity on an estoppel basis.
IV. THE PROPOSED RESTATEMENT (THRD)ABOLITION OF
INHERENT AUTHORITY
The first Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) pro-
posed the abolition of the inherent agency concept.'0 It would
be replaced by the combination of a broader concept of appar-
ent authority and expanded estoppel doctrines separately ar-
ticulated for the disclosed principal and undisclosed principal
situations. 5 The second Tentative Draft made some techni-
cal changes to the wording of the relevant sections, comments
and Reporter's notes, primarily shortening the black-letter
sections by moving some of the clarifications and qualifica-
tions to the comments. 06 It also added a new and relevant
section 3.03 titled "Creation of Apparent Authority." 7 How-
ever, these minor edits left the balance of the proposed
framework essentially unchanged. The more recent third,
fourth and fifth Tentative Drafts deal only with other por-
tions of the proposed Restatement (Third) and do not address
the matter of the sources of agency authority, leaving the sec-
published his article in 1987 that suggest judicial enthusiasm for applying the
inherent authority concept to impose respondeat superior liability.
104. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at xvii ("[T]he doctrine of inherent
agency power . . . is not used in this Restatement [Third].") See discussion su-
pra Part II.B.
105. See generally id. at xiii-xxiii, 54-88, 129-207, 212-32.
106. See generallyTentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at xvii-xxi, 72-91, 151-
215, 236-79. The most significant changes made from the first Tentative Draft
by the second Tentative Draft in the black-letter provisions with regard to the
proposed abolition of inherent authority are that a new section 3.03 addressing
the creation of apparent authority was added, the "power resulting from being
placed in a position" guidance was removed from section 2.03 and was placed in
the comments to new section 3.03, and the definition of "manifestation" was
significantly shortened and renumbered section 1.03 rather than section 1.02.
Id.
107. Id. at 236. Section 3.03 states that "[a]pparent authority, as defined in §
2.03, is created by a person's manifestation that another has authority to act
with legal consequences for the person who makes the manifestation, if a third
party reasonably believes the actor .to be authorized and the belief is traceable
to the manifestation." Id.
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ond Tentative Draft as the latest formulation in this regard.
The proposed Restatement (Third) framework of black-
letter sections that is scheduled to replace the inherent au-
thority concept of the Restatement (Second) is succinct. The
pivotal provision is section 2.03, which sets forth a much
broader apparent authority concept than that of the Restate-
ment (Second. "Apparent authority is the power held by an
agent or other actor to affect a principal's legal relations with
third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor
has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief
is traceable to the principal's manifestations." 8 The scope of
section 2.03 hinges on the breadth of the definition of "mani-
festation," which, as discussed earlier, is not a defined term
under the Restatement (Second). "Manifestation" is defined
indirectly and very broadly in the proposed Restatement
(T ird) at section 1.03: "A person manifests assent or inten-
tion through written or spoken words or other conduct."' °9
The first two Tentative Drafts make clear in numerous
places that the "other conduct" phrase of section 1.03 is in-
tended to include manifestations sufficient to create apparent
authority in those instances where a fully or partially dis-
closed principal, without making any express representations
of agent authority to third persons, simply places an agent in
a position that would lead third parties to reasonably (though
erroneously) believe that the agent had a certain customary
scope of authority."0 Sections 2.03 and 1.03 taken together
obviate the need for the use of the inherent authority concept
108. Id. at 151.
109. Id. at 72.
110. See, e.g., Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at xvi. The first Tentative
Draft's version of the "manifestation" definition:
[D]efines manifestation broadly and explains how the concept applies
when a person is appointed to a position. Illustration 1 is intended to
put to rest the justification for the doctrine of inherent agency power in
the context of a disclosed principal who appoints an agent to a known
or customary position.
Id. See also id. at 65 ("The definition of manifestation in this section is intended
to be broader than that assumed to be operative at points in the Restatement
Second of Agency. The principal consequence of this breadth is to eliminate the
rationale for a distinct doctrine of inherent agency power applicable to disclosed
principals.... ."); Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at 73-74 ("Absent notice to
third parties to the contrary, placing the agent in such a position [whose holders
customarily have authority of a certain scope] constitutes a manifestation that
the principal assents to be bound by actions by the agent that fall within that
[customary] scope.").
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to find agent authority in the "placing the agent into a posi-
tion" situations. Additionally, sections 2.03 and 1.03 displace
Restatement (Second) section 161 and extend apparent au-
thority to cover those situations that were formerly resolved
by application of the inherent authority concept, but only for
disclosed principal circumstances."1 The Restatement (Third)
makes clear that it is to remain the case, as it is now under
the Restatement (Second),"2 that statements or other conduct
of the agent alone cannot create apparent authority, unless
the agent's conduct was at the direction of the principal or
otherwise can reasonably be imputed to the principal based
on the principal's conduct.13
The fifth Tentative Draft issued in 2004 proposes a new
and comprehensive Chapter 7 that covers tort liability is-
sues." 4 Section 7.08 and the associated comments and Re-
porter's notes call for imposing liability on principals for their
agents' torts on a respondeat superior ("vicarious liability")
basis where the actions of the principal have given rise to ap-
parent authority on the part of the agent."' However, neither
section 7.08 nor the associated comments and Reporter's
notes address the issue of the appropriateness of utilizing re-
spondeat superior theories of liability in an apparent author-
ity context to impose contractual iability.
This broadened concept of apparent authority is not
applicable with regard to an undisclosed principal."6 In the
undisclosed principal situation, inherent authority will be re-
placed with expanded estoppel doctrines that will reach all
the way back to the "boundary" with actual authority. The
first Tentative Draft makes this intention clear:
When a relationship of agency exists, circumstances in
which a principal is estopped to deny the existence of au-
thority are often ones in which the origin of the third
party's belief, or the explanation for it, furnishes a divid-
ing line between the elements requisite to estoppel and
those requisite to proving apparent authority as defined in
111. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at xxi ("Apparent authority is not
present when the principal is undisclosed.").
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 8 cmt. a.
113. See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at 132-33.
114. See Tentative Draft No. 5, supra note 1, at 1-187.
115. Id. at 148-87.
116. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at xxi ("Apparent authority is not
present when the principal is undisclosed.").
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§ 2.03. Apparent authority is not present unless the third
party's belief is traceable to the principal's own manifesta-
tions, which may include placing the agent in a position
that will lead third parties to believe that the agent has
authority consistent with the position. Estoppel does not
require as close a fit between affirmative acts of the prin-
cipal and the third party's belief because it may protect
third parties who reasonably believe an actor to be author-
ized as an agent when the belief cannot be shown to follow
directly from the principal's own manifestations.
1 7
The proposed Restatement (Third) contains two related
estoppel sections, 2.05118 and 2.06,"9 that together are to re-
place Restatement (Second) section 8B. Section 2.05 closely
tracks section 8B(1) and is to apply to situations where a fully
or partially disclosed principal has not made any manifesta-
tions of authority to third parties sufficient to create apparent
authority, even under the broad new definition of "manifesta-
tion," but where the principal because of his actions (or, upon
occasion, inaction) nevertheless should be held responsible for
the third parties' belief that such authority existed.2 °
Section 2.06 is a new estoppel provision with no Re-
statement (Second) equivalent. This latter section applies to
undisclosed principal situations, and holds the principal li-
able for transactions that the third party would "reasonably
believe" were within the scope of the agent's authority, had
the third party been aware that the agent was acting for a
117. Id. at 218.
118. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at 198. Proposed section 2.05 is ti-
tled "Estoppel to Deny Existence of Agency Relationship" and states that:
[a] person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has author-
ity as an agent and who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transac-
tion purportedly done by the actor on that person's account is liable to a
third party who justifiably is induced to make a detrimental change in
position because the transaction is believed to be on the person's ac-
count, if (1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or
(2) having notice of such belief and that it might induce others to
change their positions, the person did not take reasonable steps to no-
tify them of the facts.
Id.
119. Id. at 206. Proposed section 2.06 is titled "Estoppel of Undisclosed Prin-
cipal" and states the following: "[an undisclosed principal may not rely on in-
structions given an agent that qualify or reduce the agent's authority to less
than the authority a third party would reasonably believe the agent to have un-
der the same circumstances if the principal had been disclosed." Id.
120. Id. at 198-206.
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principal rather than for his own account.12' It is intended to
displace the operation of sections 194 and 195 of the Re-
statement (Second),' and is drafted more broadly than is sec-
tion 2.05 in that the reasonable belief of the third party need
not necessarily be derived from intentional or careless action
or inaction of the principal according to its text.
The key distinction made in the Restatement (Third) be-
tween apparent authority and estoppel situations is that the
creation of apparent authority requires a manifestation by
the principal, but not reliance thereupon on the part of the
third party. Estoppel is applicable where there is no manifes-
tation by the principal, and even when the principal is not
disclosed, but the third party nevertheless reasonably be-
lieves that the agent has the authority to enter into the
transaction at issue either as an agent or on his own account,
and the principal is somehow responsible for this belief.2 '
The contours of the Restatement (Third) proposal to abol-
ish inherent authority are relatively clear in their broad out-
lines. Many of the situations now addressed under the Re-
statement (Second) by the inherent authority concept are to
be incorporated as apparent authority situations under the
broad new definition of "manifestation," particularly those re-
curring situations where a fully or partially disclosed princi-
pal has placed his agent in a position that has a customary
scope of authority that exceeds the scope of the actual author-
ity conferred.
The question of possible agency authority in other situa-
tions in which a fully or partially disclosed principal has not
created actual or apparent authority sufficient to cover the
transaction at issue, but where the principal may bear some
culpability for a reasonable (though erroneous) belief on the
part of third parties as to the scope of agent authority, are to
be addressed under section 2.05's formulation of the estoppel
doctrine rather than under the inherent authority doctrine.
121. Id. at 207-15. Section 2.06 does not incorporate the same limitations
based upon the principal's actions or inactions as are contained in Restatement
(Second) section 8B and in proposed Restatement (Third) section 2.05. See dis-
cussion infra Part V.B.2.
122. Id. at 211 Reporter's note a. ("The coverage of this section corresponds to
Restatement Second, Agency [sections] 194 and 195.").
123. See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at 138-39, 185. This would be
required at least under section 2.05, although this would perhaps not be re-
quired under section 2.06.
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The question of possible agency authority for an agent for an
undisclosed principal who exceeds his actual authority is to
be addressed under section 2.06's "reasonable belief' formula-
tion of the estoppel doctrine, rather than under the inherent
authority doctrine under Restatement (Second) sections 194
or 195.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE RESTATEMENT(THIRD)ABOLITION OF
INHERENT AUTHORITY
The Restatement (Thirdls proposal to abolish inherent
authority and replace it with a combination of broadened ap-
parent authority and more expansive use of estoppel doc-
trines has motivated two comprehensive critiques; one by
Kornelia Dormire published in 2001,124 and one subsequently
published by Matthew Ward in 2002.125
A. The Dormire Critique
The Dormire article is a student-authored comment that
was written before the publication of any of the Restatement
(Third~s five Tentative Drafts,12 but the author did have ac-
cess to the proposal's conceptual framework from an earlier
prospectus published in 1998 by Restatement (Third) Re-
porter Deborah A. DeMott, 17 and from discussions with De-
Mott. 12' After summarizing the rationale for the Restatement
(Second~s inherent authority concept and discussing its roots
in earlier case law and its post-Restatement (Second) applica-
tion, 1 29 Dormire concludes that "inherent agency power is a
concept more usefully kept separate rather than folded into
actual implied authority or conceivably into apparent author-
ity."1"' She recognizes that the most straightforward means of
incorporating inherent authority into a broader conception of
apparent authority "would be to stretch the word 'mani-
124. Dormire, supra note 13.
125. Ward, supra note 13.
126. Dormire, supra note 13, at 252. Dormire notes that "nothing authorita-
tive regarding the Restatement (Third) yet exists." Id. (citing Telephone Inter-
view with Deborah A. DeMott, David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke Law
School (Nov. 8, 1999)).
127. Dormire, supra note 13, at 251 n.49 (citing "A Revised Prospectus for a
Third Restatement of Agency," supra note 20).
128. Id. at 252 n.52.
129. Id at 246-54.
130. Id. at 255.
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fest.""' Although Dormire cited Fishman's article as support
for this interpretation,'32 she still reasoned that Fishman's
recommendation would be an unwise step for the drafters of
the Restatement (Third) to take:
[T]o include inherent agency power into apparent author-
ity will only serve to muddy the now clear concept. The
Restatement (Second)'s categories are a practical place to
draw the line so one does not confuse actual actions by a
principal with concepts of reasonable assumptions on the
part of third parties. What is most useful to those who use
a Restatement is a straightforward analytical tool. A
stretching of the word 'manifest' will not serve to clarify or
simplify the concept of apparent authority because appar-
ent authority requires actual belief. It is not a good idea
to start down the path of making exceptions to that re-
quirement. The very nature of the third category of inher-
ent agency power is that is it different [from apparent au-
thority] not in degree but in kind.13
3
Note that Dormire is reacting to the general idea of ex-
panding the definition of "manifestation" to encompass within
apparent authority all those situations now addressed by in-
herent authority principles, as was strongly advocated by
Fishman."3 She does not focus her critique on the specific
(and slightly more limited) Restatement (Third) proposal,
which was not yet available at the time she wrote her article.
The Restatement (Third) embraces this broader "manifesta-
tion" approach only with regard to disclosed principal circum-
stances, and utilizes broader estoppel doctrines to displace
inherent authority under those circumstances where the
principal is undisclosed. Dormire's central criticism of the
proposed new definition of "manifestation" is that it conflates
authority based upon the actual intentions of the principal,
expressed by his conduct or communications, with authority
based not on the principal's conduct but upon protection of
the reasonable expectations of third parties arising from cus-
tomary agent practices. This criticism is equally applicable to
the Restatement (Thirdis approach as it is to the more
sweeping recommendation made earlier by Fishman.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 256 n.73 (discussing Fishman, supra note 12, at 42).
133. Dormire, supra note 13, at 256.
134. See generally Fishman, supra note 12.
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Dormire places too much importance on retaining the or-
dinary definition of "manifestation." She is clearly correct
that there is an important conceptual distinction between the
situation where a third party's belief as to the extent of agent
authority is based upon express representations made by the
principal, and the situation where the belief is based solely on
the third party's reasonable expectation that an agent placed
into a position will have the customary scope of authority for
that position. In practice, however, these situations shade
into one another. The courts have been unable to consistently
determine where along this continuum to classify the situa-
tion where a principal, without more, simply places his agent
into a position of customary authority: is this a "manifesta-
tion" of authority or not?"5 If the liability of the principal
hinged on this classification then this conceptual distinction
would have to be maintained, however difficult to apply.
However, since both apparent authority and inherent author-
ity are sufficient bases for principal liability, then the difficult
distinction between the two is unnecessary and can and
should be discarded.
13 6
B. The Ward Critique
Matthew Ward had access to the first three Tentative
Drafts of the Restatement (Third) when he wrote his article.
13 7
His theoretical analysis of the Restatement (Third]s proposal
and its relationship to the Restatement (Second~s categories
suffers from errors in his understanding of the basic relation-
ship between apparent authority and inherent authority un-
der the Restatement (Second).' Nevertheless, his analysis is
135. See discussion supra Part III.B.
136. Again, the distinction is occasionally of significance where the agent at
issue is a "special" rather than a "general" agent. See supra note 49.
137. Ward, supra note 13, at 1597.
138. For example, Ward claims that "apparent authority is a subset of inher-
ent agency." Id. at 1596. This is incorrect because, as discussed above, under
section 8A of the Restatement (Second) "inherent agency power" is "derived not
from.., apparent authority... but solely from the agency relation .... "
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 8A; see discussion supra Part II; see
also SEAVEY, supra note 29, at 15 ("Inherent agency power... is a term first
used ... to explain the liability of the principal in cases in which the agent who
conducts a transaction has neither authority nor apparent authority and there
are no estoppel elements.").
Apparent authority and inherent authority are not nested one within the
other, but instead are mutually exclusive bases for agency authority. Ward
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important to consider because of his claim that the proposed
Restatement (Third) framework narrows the scope of liability
for principals because they would no longer be held liable for
contracts entered into on their behalf by their agents under
some circumstances in which they are held liable under the
Restatement (Second) inherent authority concept." 9 In sup-
port of this claim, Ward discusses several cases that have
held a principal liable on an inherent authority theory. He
believes that under the proposed Restatement (Third) frame-
work these cases would be decided differently and in favor of
the principal escaping liability.40
Ward may be correct that even under the broad Restate-
ment (Third) formulation of the scope of apparent authority
there would be no apparent authority found in some or all of
these cases, and of course under this formulation no inherent
authority basis would be available for imposing liability.
However, he perhaps is overlooking the significance of pro-
posed sections 2.05 and 2.06."4 These estoppel provisions are
intended specifically to complement the expansion of appar-
ent authority by replacing the inherent authority doctrine as
a basis for imposing liability for situations that merit liabil-
ity, but that do not fit into the expanded apparent authority
framework.
1. Croisant v. Watrud
The most significant of these cases that Ward notes in his
article is Croisant v. Watrud,"' a well-known opinion in which
an accounting partnership was held liable for a contract en-
later claims that since "apparent authority is a subset of inherent agency," an
expansion of apparent authority, no matter how substantial, "could not have
overtaken inherent agency .... ." Ward, supra note 13, at 1602-03. This does
not follow logically, even were apparent authority nested within inherent au-
thority, because a subset could be expanded more than enough to encompass the
entire set that it falls within.
139. Ward, supra note 13, at 1587-88. Ward comments that the Restate-
ment (Third) "claims to expand the definition of 'manifestation,' thereby broad-
ening apparent authority to include everything that inherent agency currently
regulates." Id. Ward then rebuts this claim of the Restatement (Third) "by ar-
guing that apparent authority under the draft of the Third Restatement does
not, and cannot, embrace all of the cases in which a principal would be liable
based on inherent agency." Id.
140. Id. at 1623-26.
141. See discussion supra Part IV.
142. 432 P.2d 799 (Or. 1967).
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tered into on its behalf by one of its accountants, Watrud, who
was the managing partner of a local branch office of the firm.
The plaintiff Croisant previously engaged the firm to do her
taxes, and the work had been done by Watrud. Watrud later
entered into another agreement with Croisant under which
he was to collect payments made in connection with a sale of
one of the plaintiffs properties, and later to maintain her fi-
nancial records. The accounting firm never authorized
Watrud to assume these particular responsibilities nor repre-
sented to the plaintiff that it had. The court found no basis
for determining that services provided by Watrud were cus-
tomary accounting services, and analyzed the issue of the
firm's potential liability under general agency law principles,
rather than by considering the possible applicability of the
Oregon partnership statutes to impose liability upon a part-
nership for a partner's acts.'43 The court then found that no
actual authority existed for the transaction and that no mani-
festations of authority had been made by the principal to the
plaintiff, which would have created apparent authority. The
court held the accounting firm liable under Restatement (Sec-
ond) section 8A on an inherent authority basis.'"
The Croisant case embraces a very expansive interpreta-
tion of the scope of inherent authority and thereby lends cre-
dence to Fishman's concerns. The opinion goes beyond simply
finding inherent authority to exist for those transactions that
are customary for an agent placed into a particular position,
taking the view that such a limitation of scope may well apply
under the section 161 inherent authority provision, but not to
section 8A which more broadly serves to promote fairness and
commercial convenience, and declares that under section8A, inherent authority exists with regard to any transaction
143. Id. at 801. The lower court in this case held that Watrud's contract
with Croisant was an "'independent trustee employment'" that was "separate
and distinct from the activities in which the partnership was engaged." Id.
Thus, the contract eliminated partnership liability for partner acts done in the
ordinary course of partnership as a theory of liability, leaving only the possibil-
ity of principal liability under general agency law principles, which it deter-
mined did not exist. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed this lower court
ruling, but did so only on the basis that the lower court had misapplied agency
law, and not on the arguably equally if not more plausible basis that partner
Watrud's actions were done in the ordinary course of partnership business,
which it did not consider. See id.
144. See id. at 801-02.
145. See id. at 802-03.
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that the third party "reasonably believes" is within the
agent's scope of authority, even if the transaction is not
within the customary scope of authority for an agent placed in
that position.'46
Ward argues that the Croisant case would have a differ-
ent outcome under the proposed Restatement (Third) frame-
work.'47 First, he claims that "the draft of the Third Restate-
ment arguably does not broaden the manifestations that
create apparent authority,"' 4' by which he appears to be say-
ing that courts, as a matter of practice, are already utilizing
the broader manifestation definition proposed by the Re-
statement (Third). Ward is correct when he concludes that
even under the expansive Restatement (Third) definition of
"manifestation," Watrud would lack apparent authority, since
the firm made no representations as to his authority to en-
gage in the transactions at issue, and the conduct he engaged
in was not regarded by the court as. customary for an ac-
countant.'49 However, Ward then erroneously concludes that
since under the Restatement (Third) proposal Watrud would
still lack both actual and apparent authority, and inherent
authority would be abolished, then the accounting partner-
ship would have escaped liability under the Restatement(Third). 15 0
The Croisant circumstances appear to me to be exactly
the sort of disclosed principal situation that the proposed sec-
tion 2.05 estoppel provision is intended to address. Having
engaged Watrud's firm to do her taxes, as the Croisant court
notes,' 5' the plaintiff would reasonably expect Watrud to have
the firm's authorization to engage in any further accounting-
related financial services that he offered to perform for her,
even those payment-handling services that were not custom-
ary for an accountant to perform. The firm was arguably
careless in not reviewing Watrud's acts to see that he did not
exceed his authorization.' Therefore, it is unlikely that the
146. See id. at 803.
147. Ward, supra note 13, at 1624.
148. Id.
149. See Croisant, 432 P.2d at 801.
150. Ward, supra note 13, at 1624.
151. Id. at 803-04.
152. Fishman, supra note 12, at 34 n.161 ("[T]he amount of the payments
might have put the accounting firm on notice that more services were being
rendered than normal services.").
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firm would have escaped liability under the Restatement
(Third) framework; instead, liability would have been im-
posed on an estoppel rather than an inherent authority basis.
For that matter, a better rationale in Croisant for holding the
principal liable under the Restatement (Second) framework
would have been to apply estoppel under section 8B, again on
the basis that the principal intentionally or carelessly caused
the third party's erroneous belief.153
2. Kahn v. Royal Banks of Missouri andMenard Inc. v.
Dage-MTI, Inc.
Another case offered by Ward in support of his argument
is Kahn v. Royal Banks of Missourl."M The agent there made
a representation of agency authority to the third parties, and
the position in which the agent was placed by the principal
was not one where the third party would customarily expect
him to have the requisite scope of authority for the transac-
tion at issue. The court in Kahn, as an alternative basis to
imposing apparent authority liability, found inherent author-
ity to exist that was as broad in scope as the agent's represen-
tations of authority. '55 It reasoned that the commercial con-
venience rationale of section 8A justified placing the risk of
an agent's dishonesty upon the principal. 56
Ward also discusses Menard Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc.'57 A
corporation president there had represented to a third party
that he had the authority to enter the corporation into a spe-
cific transaction. The third party then proceeded with the
transaction even though the third party was aware that for
153. Although, perhaps an even more plausible doctrinal basis would have
been to hold the firm contractually liable under the applicable partnership stat-
utes, which generally hold partnerships liable for contracts entered into on their
behalf by a partner in the ordinary course of partnership business. In this case,
they would show that the financial services performed by Watrud were in fact
ordinary and customary accounting services.
Cange v. Stotler & Co., Inc., 826 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1987), is another case
noted by Ward that is similar to Croisant in that the position in which the dis-
closed principal placed the agent was not the type that would customarily have
the authority to engage in the transaction at issue. Thus, there would likely be
no apparent authority even under the Restatement (Third). However, once
again, the circumstances would probably give rise to estoppel liability under
section 2.05 of the Restatement (Third) framework.
154. 790 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
155. Id. at 508-09.
156. Id. at 509.
157. 726 N.E.2d 1206 (Ind. 2000).
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prior comparable transactions specific board authorization
was required to bind the corporation."8 The court ruled that
the third party's awareness of the limitations imposed on the
president's authority precluded a finding that apparent au-
thority existed,'59 but nevertheless ruled that because the
president was in the position of sole corporate negotiator of
the transaction he had the inherent authority to bind the
firm.
160
Kahn and Menard are additional cases that support
Fishman's argument that the inherent authority doctrine has
the potential to be applied to impose respondeat superior con-
tractual liability upon a principal in a contractual context. It
seems likely that even under the broad Restatement (Third)
formulation as to what conduct by a principal comprises the
requisite "manifestation" apparent authority would be lacking
in these two cases. However, the principals in both Kahn and
Menard probably each bore sufficient culpability for the third
party's belief of authorization to justify holding these princi-
pals liable under an expansive reading of the section 2.05 es-
toppel provision. 6' Such a determination of culpability seems
a somewhat closer call in Menard than in Kahn given the
questionable reasonableness of the third party's belief in the
former case.
3. Conclusion
Ward is accurate if his claim regarding these three cases
is limited to the narrow proposition that the expanded scope
of apparent authority under the proposed Restatement
(Third) is not sufficient to impose principal contractual liabil-
ity in all situations where liability has previously been im-
posed through invocation of inherent authority principles.
However, if his claim is understood as the much broader one
that the overall Restatement (Third) framework would oper-
ate to allow a class of principals now being held liable on in-
herent authority grounds to escape liability,62 he is incorrect
because he overlooks the operation of the proposed new sec-
158. Id at 1214.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 1214; Kahn v. Royal Banks of Missouri, 790 S.W.2d 503,508-
09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
162. See the discussion and criticism of Ward's analysis supra note 138.
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tions 2.05 and 2.06. The proposed Restatement (Third) aboli-
tion of inherent authority and expansion of apparent author-
ity and estoppel-based liability can perhaps be criticized in
some regards, but not on the basis that it would reduce the
liability of principals to less than that imposed under the Re-
statement (Second).
C. Additional Criticisms of the Restatement (Third) Proposal
At this point I will offer a few additional criticisms that I
have of the Restatement (Thirdjs proposal to abolish inherent
authority that were not made by either Dormire or Ward.
The first of these criticisms is not a substantive criticism of
the merits of the proposal, but instead is a stylistic criticism
of the incomplete manner in which the rationale for the pro-
posal is presented in the Tentative Drafts. The latter two
criticisms that I offer are substantive.
1. Stylistic Criticism
There is not a single reference to Fishman's article in any
of the five Tentative Drafts that have been released. This is a
striking omission, since Fishman's article is, in my opinion,
unquestionably the definitive critique of the Restatement
(Second)s inherent authority concept. Moreover, Fishman
advocated abolishing the concept of inherent authority using
a very similar expanded definition of "manifestation" ap-
proach as has been used by the Restatement (Third) proposal.
The Tentative Drafts, both in the comments and in the Re-
porter's notes, do cite a large number of articles that address
some particular aspect of the inherent authority question,
163
but some discussion of or at least reference to Fishman's cri-
163. See, e.g., Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at 229 (citing Randy Bar-
nett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1969, 1996 (1987) (relating to undisclosed principal liability questions)), 231
(citing DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 400-01 (5th ed. 1998) (relat-
ing to "placing an agent in a position" issues), and MELVIN EISENBERG, AN
INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 16 (2d ed. 1995) (relating to in-
herent agency power)); Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at 84 (citing Aaron
Lipson, Whose Fool Is It Anyway: Updating Apparent Authority for Today's
Business World, 33 GA. L. REV. 1219, 1247 (1999) (relating to expanding the
definition of apparent authority)), 85 (citing Grace M. Giesel, Enforcement of
Settlement Contracts: The Problem of the Attorney Agent, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 543, 561 (1999) (regarding inherent authority in the lawsuit settlement
agreement context)).
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tique and proposal is called for."
To the extent that the Tentative Drafts do attempt to jus-
tify the proposed abolition of inherent authority, this is ac-
complished almost exclusively through numerous hypotheti-
cal illustrations and other discussions that suggest that the
goal of the Restatement (Third~s proposal is to simplify the
work of courts while maintaining the contractual liability of
principals in all situations where such liability has previously
been imposed under the inherent authority concept. There
are also references made to cases that already embrace the
broad definition of manifestation favored by the Restatement
(Third) in the "placing an agent into a position" context,16 and
to cases already embracing the proposed section 2.06 estoppel
principle for undisclosed principal circumstances,' 66 which to-
gether suggest that the proposal is largely tracking actual
court practice. These are all strong arguments in favor of the
Restatement (Third) proposal.
The Tentative Drafts, however, should also contain dis-
cussion of Fishman's concerns that the inherent authority
concept may be used to import respondeat superior liability
into the contractual context, and of his recommendation to
avoid this specter by substituting an expanded concept of ap-
parent authority based on a broader definition of "manifesta-
tion." The Tentative Drafts should also explain the decision
made to not adopt Fishman's sweeping proposal, but to in-
stead utilize the new definition of "manifestation" only in the
disclosed principal context and rely on reformulated estoppel
doctrines in undisclosed principal situations. There should
also be a comprehensive discussion of why this new definition
of "manifestation" is not as susceptible to use by a court as a
basis for imposing respondeat superior liability as the inher-
164. This omission will likely be remedied somewhat, since writing this arti-
cle I have been assured by Deborah A. Demott, the Reporter for the Restate-
ment (Third), that the final official text will include some citations to Fishman's
work. Email message from Deborah A. DeMott, David F. Cavers Professor of
Law, Duke Law School, to Gregory Crespi, Professor of Law, Dedman School of
Law, Southern Methodist University (Aug. 16, 2004) (on file with author).
165. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at 179 ("Many cases also tie the sig-
nificance of custom closely to apparent authority based on the position occupied
by the agent."). See also DeMott, supra note 20, at 1047 ("IT]o the extent some
contemporary cases broadly define the circumstances that warrant a finding of
apparent authority, this development may have overtaken the doctrine of in-
herent agency power.").
166. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at xxii-xxiii.
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ent authority concept it replaced.
Fishman offers a powerful argument that the Restate-
ment (Second) inherent authority concept, grounded as it is
not in the representations made by a principal to third par-
ties but instead in an assessment of what scope of agency au-
thority is fair to third parties and best promotes commercial
convenience in light of the reasonable expectations of all con-
cerned, is an extraordinarily vague and flexible doctrine that
is not a trustworthy constraint on judicial discretion. His
concerns about the potential for the imposition of respondeat
superior liability in the contractual context through this doc-
trine are reasonably plausible, despite the limited evidence to
date that the courts are inclined to go beyond imposing con-
tractual liability for transactions done within the customary
scope of agent authority and impose respondeat superior li-
ability.'67 These concerns should be addressed in the ration-
ale presented for the proposal.
2. Substantive Criticisms
This stylistic criticism leads to my two substantive criti-
cisms of the Restatement (Third) proposal, both of which re-
late to the potential respondeat superior liability concern.
First, it is possible that the courts will someday embrace
Mearns' arguments (in their more absolute formulation as
characterized by Fishman)" that the appropriate balance to
be struck in application of the inherent authority doctrine is
to broadly impose liability on principals in a manner akin to
respondeat superior tort liability. Given this possibility, it
would be wise for the drafters of the Restatement (Third) to
attempt to preclude such an outcome. However, the very
broad definition of "manifestation" which is proposed by the
Restatement (Third) as a replacement for most inherent au-
thority situations, while it solves the problem of the conflict-
ing jurisprudence at the border of apparent authority and in-
herent authority, appears to be just as open to expansive,
result-oriented application at its outer extreme as is the in-
herent authority doctrine it would replace. As noted by Dor-
mire, this broad definition of "manifestation" juxtaposes un-
167. But see Menard, 726 N.E.2d 206; Kahn, 790 S.W.2d 503; Croisant, 432
P.2d 799.
168. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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der its linguistic umbrella two sources of agent authority-
inherent authority and apparent authority-that differ fun-
damentally in kind from one another.169 This non-intuitive
grouping undercuts the ability of the new definition of "mani-
festation" to serve as a precise and reliable bulwark against
expansive respondeat superior rulings that would extend li-
ability beyond the scope of customary agent authority since it
now has lost its congruence with established judicial under-
standing of what it means for a person to make a manifesta-
tion of agent authority through his conduct.
The second and related substantive criticism is that the
Restatement (ThiLrds proposed estoppel sections and their
comments and reporter's notes also do not appear to have
been drafted with the danger in mind of their potential ex-
pansive application to impose respondeat superior liability in
the contractual context. Section 7.08 addresses vicarious li-
ability, but by its terms it only applies to tort liability is-
sues.17° Section 2.05 largely tracks section 8B(1) of the Re-
statement (Second). Section 2.06 only extends the estoppel
doctrine to cover circumstances involving an undisclosed
principal, and moreover does so without expressly incorporat-
ing the section 8B limitations based on the principal's con-
duct.'7 ' Neither of these sections nor their accompanying
comments attempts to clarify that estoppel should not be used
to impose respondeat superior liability upon principals.
VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE RESTATEMENT(THIRD)PROPOSAL
AND SUGGESTED REVISIONS
A. Overall Assessment
My overall assessment of the Restatement (Third) pro-
posal to abolish inherent authority should by now be clear to
anyone who has had the patience to read this far. The Re-
statement (Second]s inherent authority and estoppel frame-
work has several problems: a minor problem of conceptual dif-
ficulties encountered when classifying situations along the
border of apparent authority and inherent authority, leading
169. Dormire, supra note 13, at 256.
170. See discussion supra Part IV.
171. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.06. Though it does limit liability
to the extent of the relying third party's "reasonable" belief, which might be
used to accomplish the same ends. Id.
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to inconsistent judicial rationales for imposing liability; and a
more serious problem of having the potential for being ap-
plied to extend broad respondeat superior liability to the con-
tractual context. If the Restatement (Third) proposal is
adopted, which seems likely, it will resolve this minor concep-
tual classification difficulty. This is a positive point, but the
respondeat superior concerns will continue to persist even if
the Restatement (Third) proposal is endorsed by the ALI and
subsequently embraced by the courts.
By eliminating the concept of inherent authority, the Re-
statement (Third) proposal does remove the possibility that
the inherent authority concept will be applied expansively to
impose respondeat superior liability in the contractual con-
text. However, this respondeat superior concern will persist
because of the manner in which inherent authority has been
displaced by a significant expansion of the scope of apparent
authority through the use of a very broad definition of "mani-
festation." Freed from its linguistic moorings in common us-
age, this new and artificial definition has no intuitive limits
and could easily be broadened further by the courts so as to
impose respondeat superior liability in the contractual con-
text.172 The potential respondeat superior liability problem
will still exist, simply incorporated under a different linguis-
tic formulation. This is a significant shortcoming of the Re-
statement (Third~s proposal. Presented below are a number
of complementary suggestions as to how this potential prob-
lem could be more effectively avoided through inclusion of ad-
ditional and more explicit comments and illustrations.
The other major shortcoming of the Restatement
(ThirdIs proposal to abolish inherent authority is that the
proposal fails to address the possible use of the estoppel doc-
trines to impose broad respondeat superior liability on princi-
pals for unauthorized agent contractual transactions. The
revised formulation of the estoppel doctrines presented by
sections 2.05 and 2.06 may be even more susceptible to such
an interpretation than is Restatement (Second) section 8B.
The proposal should therefore be modified in an attempt to
172. A careful reading of the comments and Reporter's notes to sections 1.03,
2.03, 3.03 and 7.08 suggests that this is not the intent of the drafters. See Ten-
tative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at 72-91, 151-88, 236-79; Tentative Draft No. 5,
supra note 1, at 148-87. However, their intent is difficult to ascertain and needs
to be made much more explicit.
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forestall the possibility that estoppel liability will be ex-
tended. This is particularly necessary because the elimina-
tion of inherent authority and the clarification of the intended
scope of apparent authority will channel the pressures to ex-
pand liability into the estoppel provisions, and history shows
that the courts have been willing to apply estoppel doctrines
broadly and flexibly as needed to achieve their desired objec-
tives. 1
73
When drafting restatement provisions, one always faces
the choice between including detailed clarifications and quali-
fications directly in the black-letter section provisions, thus
risking that those provisions will become too cumbersome and
complex to provide useful guidance, or drafting the section
provisions in sparse and general language and instead provid-
ing the necessary clarifications and qualifications in com-
ments, illustrations or Reporter's notes, or all of the above,
where they may unfortunately be overlooked. The approach
taken by the drafters of the Restatement (Third) is to utilize
succinct black-letter section provisions supported by exten-
sive commentary."' I will abide by this stylistic choice, and
also offer my suggestions regarding the new estoppel provi-
sions in the form of additional commentary rather than pro-
posed revisions of the black-letter sections at issue.
B. Suggested Changes in the Restatement (Third)
1. Clarifying the Scope ofApparent Authority
Let me begin with the problem of the potential for inter-
pretation of the new broad "manifestation" term to impose re-
spondeat superior liability under the apparent authority pro-
vision. Section 1.03 only indirectly defines the term, and in
very terse fashion.'75 While sections 1.03, 2.03, and 3.03 are
each followed by extensive commentary, 7 6 that commentary
173. See supra note 105.
174. See generally DeMott, supra note 20, at 1041 (criticizing the 528-
provision structure of the Restatement (Second) on the basis that it "emphasizes
detailed treatment at the occasional expense of a general articulation of princi-
ples," and thereby sacrifices "the opportunity that generalization presents to
explore underlying rationales more fully.").
175. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at 72 ("A person manifests assent or
intention through written or spoken words or other conduct.").
176. Id. at 72-91, 151-88, 236-79. The official comments and reporter's notes
to proposed Restatement (Third) sections 1.03, 2.03, and 3.03 are twenty, thirty-
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does not clearly enough rule out a respondeat superior liabil-
ity interpretation of the new apparent authority concept. Ad-
ditional language should be added to the comments and Re-
porter's notes for proposed new Restatement (Third) sections
1.03, 2.03 and 3.03, respectively, which will make sufficiently
clear that the intent of the drafters of the Restatement
(Third) is that this broad new concept of apparent authority
should not be utilized to impose repondeat superior liability.
Presented below are six specific suggestions along these to
address these concerns.
First, I would insert into the fourth paragraph of com-
ment b. to section 1.03 (this paragraph is set forth below in
its entirety) the following underlined phrases:
Moreover, an agent is sometimes placed in a position in an
industry or setting in which holders of the position cus-
tomarily have authority of a specific scope. Absent notice
to third parties to the contrary, placing the agent in such a
position constitutes a manifestation that the principal as-
sents to be bound by actions by the agent that fall within
that scope, but does not constitute a manifestation that
the principal assents to be bound by actions that fall out-
side of that customary scope of authority, even if the third
party believes that the principal has so assented. A third
party who interacts with the person, believing that mani-
festation to be true, need not establish a communication
made directly to the third party to the principal to estab-
lish the presence of apparent authority as defined in Sec-
tion 2.03. For further discussion, see Section 2.03, Com-
ment d, and Section 3.03, Comment b.
Second, I would add to the end of the second paragraph of
Reporter's note b to section 1.03 the following underlined ma-
terial:
For a discussion of how the use of this broader definition
of manifestation for apparent authority purposes can
serve to limit the possibility that respondeat superior li-
ability can be imposed upon principals that might extend
beyond the customary scope of authority for those posi-
tions in which principals place their agents, see generally
Steven A. Fishman, Inherent Agency Power-Should En-
terprise Liability Apply to Agents' Unauthorized Con-
eight, and forty-four pages in length, respectively, and contain a total of twenty-
eight illustrations. Id.
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tracts? 19 Rut. L. J. 1 (1987).
The original formulation of Restatement (Third) section
2.03 presented in the first Tentative Draft included the sen-
tence set forth immediately below, which was then removed
in the second Tentative Draft and replaced by commentary to
new section 3.03,177 apparently in accordance with the draft-
ers' preference for sparse, general black-letter language ac-
companied by extensive commentary:
When an agent holds a position within an organization, or
has been placed in charge of a transaction or situation, a
third party acts reasonably in believing that agent has au-
thority to do acts consistent with the position the agent
occupies absent knowledge of circumstances that would
lead a reasonable third party to inquire into the existence,
extent, or nature of the agent's authority.
178
Since the specific language above that addresses the im-
plications of placing an agent into a position of customary au-
thority no longer appears in the black-letter formulation of
section 2.03, it is very important that the comments make
that clear. The seventh paragraph of comment d. to section
2.03 fairly clearly limits the scope of apparent authority to
customary authority,' 9 and is followed by three helpful illus-
trations,8 ° but it does not state the limitation as directly and
unmistakably as it might. Moreover, there is no illustration
presented based on the troubling Croisant v. Watrud opinion
discussed above which would rule out finding apparent au-
thority under such circumstances. 8' Given the prominence of
177. Id. at xx.
178. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at 129.
179. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at 162 ("The fact that it is custom-
ary for participants in an industry to be represented by agents does not invest
an agent with apparent authority to do acts other than those customary to the
agent's position.").
180. Id. at 163-64.
181. The facts presented in the Croisant opinion admittedly do not provide a
.clean" illustration for clarifying the limits of apparent authority, given that the
inherent authority issues are presented and resolved in Croisant in a context
where partnership liability under the partnership statutes is arguably present
as well, and where tort liability as well as contract liability are present. I am
grateful to Deborah A. DeMott for calling my attention to these nuances of the
Croisant opinion. E-mail message from Deborah A. DeMott, David F. Cavers
Professor of Law, Duke Law School, to Gregory Crespi, Professor of Law, Ded-
man School of Law, Southern Methodist University (Aug. 16, 2004) (on file with
author).
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that case as the leading example of an expansive view of the
scope of inherent authority, an illustration clearly distin-
guishing it from circumstances that would give rise to appar-
ent authority under the new Restatement (Third) framework
would be desirable. As a third suggestion, I would add after
the end of illustration number 7 in comment d. to section 2.03
two new paragraphs with the following underlined material:
A manifestation by a principal that consists solely of plac-
ing an agent in a position having customary authority
does not create apparent authority that extends beyond
the scope of such customary authority for the position.
ILLUSTRATION:
8. A, a partner in P partnership, an accounting firm, pro-
vides accounting services to firm clients. A enters into a
contract with client T on behalf of P and within the scope
of his authority, and performs the required services under
the contract. A later enters into another contract with T
that is outside of his scope of authority, and outside of the
scope of authority customary for partners or for agents of
a partnership placed in his position. P was not aware of
this second contract at the time that it was entered into.
P by placing A in his position as P's agent has not made a
manifestation creating apparent authority for the second
contract.
Fourth, I would add at the end of the eighth paragraph to
Reporter's note d. to section 2.03 the following underlined
material:
Illustration No. 8 is based on Croisant v. Watrud 432 P.2d
799 (Or. 1967), a case finding a principal partnership li-
able for partner acts done outside of the scope of the part-
ner's actual or apparent authority, on an inherent author-
ity basis, and is intended to make clear that a finding of
apparent authority is not called for under those circum-
stances where an agent placed into a position without fur-
ther manifestation of authority by the principal exceeds
the scope of authority customary for agents placed in such
a position.
Fifth, I would add to the end of the second paragraph of
comment b. to section 3.03 the following underlined material:
A manifestation by a principal that consists solely of plac-
ing an agent in a position having customary authority
does not create apparent authority that extends beyond
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the scope of such customary authority for the position.
Finally, I would add a comment to section 7.08 to the
general effect that the imposition of respondeat superior li-
ability upon principals for agent torts in apparent authority
contexts under that section is not intended to imply that it is
also appropriate to impose contractual liability upon princi-
pals for agent transactions that exceed the scope of the ap-
parent authority conferred. Something along the following
lines should suffice:
Section 7.08 is intended to apply only to impose vicarious
tort liability upon principals where appropriate, and
should not be taken to suggest that such imposition of vi-
carious liability is an appropriate basis for imposing con-
tractual liability on principals as a result of their agents'
conduct.
2. Clarifjing the Scope of the Estoppel Doctrines
Let me also offer some suggested modifications to the Re-
statement (Third) proposal aimed at assuring that the section
2.05 and 2.06 estoppel provisions will not become vehicles for
imposing respondeat superior liability in the contractual con-
text. The comments to sections 1.03, 2.03, and 3.03, as dis-
cussed above, show that considerable thought was given to
the question of the scope of apparent authority, even if one
agrees that the commentary is not quite clear enough with
regard to this potential for imposing respondeat superior li-
ability. However, the comments to sections 2.05 and 2.06 are
much less extensive,'82 and they do not appear to have been
drafted with the potential respondeat superior liability prob-
lem in mind.
Section 2.05 carries forward from Restatement (Second)
section 8B(1) the limitation that estoppel-based liability is
only appropriate where either the principal has intentionally
or carelessly caused the third party's belief as to agent au-
thorization, or at least knew of the third party's erroneous be-
lief and failed to correct it."' The comment to section 2.05
182. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at 198-206, 207-15. The com-
bined official comment and Reporter's notes to proposed Restatement (Thnird)
sections 2.05 and 2.06 are only nine pages for each section, and together contain
a total of only eight illustrations. Id.
183. Id. at 204 ("This section [2.051 corresponds in operative respects to Re-
statement Second, Agency [section] 8B(1).").
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states that the principal under this section may be liable for
transactions on the basis of a "failure to use reasonable
care... to prevent circumstances that foreseeably led to the
belief' by the third party that the agent had sufficient author-
ity to enter the principal into the transaction at issue.""
This language gives rise to the concern that a principal
who could foresee that a third person might somehow believe
that an agent had authority that exceeded the scope of cus-
tomary authority for the position, and does not learn of this
erroneous belief until after the transaction at issue has been
entered into, might be held liable under this provision. This
concern should be addressed more clearly. Leaving this
black-letter section as is, some additional language should be
added to the comment to clarify that the mere placing of an
agent into a position of customary authority, without doing
any more to influence a third party's belief as to the scope of
the agent's authority, should not be regarded as a basis for
imposing liability on the principal using estoppel basis for
agent transactions that exceed the scope of the customary au-
thority for the position. Specifically, at the end of the first
paragraph of comment a. to section 2.05 should be added a
second paragraph containing the following underlined mate-
rial:
The placing by a principal of his agent into a position hav-
ing a customary scope of authority, without more, should
not be regarded as a basis for imposing liability on the
principal under this section for a transaction with a third
party which exceeds this customary scope of authority,
unless the principal subsequently becomes aware that the
third party has a justified but erroneous belief as to the
scope of the agent's authority, and once becoming aware
does not take reasonable efforts to correct that belief prior
to the third party entering into that transaction.
Section 2.06 is somewhat more problematic than section
2.05 because it speaks only of imposing liability to protect a
third party who "reasonably believes" that an agent has suffi-
cient authority to enter the principal into the transaction at
issue. Section 2.06 does not expressly require that the beliefs
be grounded in the actions or inactions of the principal, or,
perhaps more importantly, have any particular relationship
184. Id. at 199.
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to the customary scope of agent authority for the position in
question. It might be preferable to include in the black-letter
formulation the same limitations on principal liability that
are now contained in Restatement (Second) section 8B(1) and
carried forward in proposed section 2.05. However, a more
modest and sufficient approach to properly limit the scope of
this provision would be to leave proposed section 2.06 as it
now is, but add the following underlined material as a clarify-
ing and limiting comment to the end of the first paragraph of
comment c. to section 2.06:
An undisclosed principal should not be held liable under
section 2.06 for transactions that exceed the customary
scope of authority for agents placed in such a position, re-
gardless of whether the third party involved would rea-
sonably believe that the agent was so authorized had the
principal been disclosed ....
VII. CONCLUSION
The proposal to abolish inherent authority in the Re-
statement (Third) is a step in the right direction, and ad-
dresses some of the jurisprudential concerns that the inher-
ent authority concept has raised. However, the proposal does
not go far enough to eliminate the lurking respondeat supe-
rior liability possibilities that exist under both the inherent
authority and estoppel provisions of the Restatement (Sec-
ond). While these remaining concerns could be addressed by
changing the proposed black-letter provisions, some relatively
minor additions to the relevant comments and Reporter's
notes along the lines suggested above will suffice.
I hope that the drafters of the Restatement (Third) will
take these suggestions seriously. If they do not, and the ALI
then endorses an Official Draft of the Restatement (Third)
that does not better address these concerns, then I hope that
the courts to the extent they embrace the Restatement
(Third) will take into account the considerations identified in
this article and resist any pressures to impose respondeat su-
perior liability in the contractual context, whether those pres-
sures arise under the apparent authority doctrine or under
the estoppel doctrines.
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